

MACCARES MACAO CONFIDENTIAL AVIATION REPORTING SYSTEM

MACCARES BULLETIN

Issue 5, May 2017

MACCARES bulletin is published by the Accident Prevention and Investigation Group (APIG) by using the de-identified information collected from MACCARES. It serves as a platform for sharing aviation safety information in the community.

Reports received through MACCARES are accepted in good faith. Anonymous report is not encouraged because APIG staff cannot contact an anonymous reporter to verify the report or to seek additional information.

Below are some of the reports extracted from MACCARES database:

Pilot felt tired when operating the second sector at late night

The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding fatigue experienced by flight crew when operating two consecutive sectors. Less than three hours of ground time was scheduled between these two sectors. The reporter mentioned pilots felt very tired when operating the second sector which was in late night period.

The reporter also mentioned that the airline he worked for always scheduled pilots to work at maximum duty time allowed, which made the pilots felt exhausted. He concerned that it could increase the risk of accident if the flights were operated by less experienced pilots who were exhausted and tired.

The reporter suggested scheduling a layover between the two consecutive sectors mentioned above to provide more rest time to crew members.

Paragraph 51 to 54 of the *Air Navigation Regulation of Macao* approved by Executive Order 62/2016 address Fatigue of Crew. Flight time and duty time of flight crew is governed by Aeronautical Circular AC/OPS/013R00 *Avoidance of Fatigue in Aircrew*. Provisions for flight duty period in late night period are prescribed in paragraph 14 of the attachment of this Aeronautical Circular. All operators and crew members of Macao registered aircraft have to comply with the provisions of the FTL Scheme approved by the AACM. If a pilot is suffering or is likely to suffer from fatigue, he/she is not fit for duty and shall not fly. The operator must not cause or allow that pilot to fly.

This safety concern was followed up by the related AACM department. The compliance with the FTL Scheme will continue to be monitored during surveillance audits with attention to the oversight of late finishes/early starts.

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Long duty hour of cabin crew

The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding cabin crew duty hour. It was mentioned in the MACCARES report that at least two cabin crew members continued their flight duty after long office duty at the airline's headquarter, and their working hours had exceeded 16 hours. The reporter concerned this would violate the AACM regulation. The reporter doubt whether the cabin crew members could perform their safety duty effectively if emergency happened.

Provisions relating to cabin crew flight duty period are prescribed in paragraph 31 of the attachment of Aeronautical Circular AC/OPS/013R00 *Avoidance of Fatigue in Aircrew*.

The information provided is insufficient to determine if there was any violation to the flight time limit requirements. Since this is an anonymous report, APIG is not able to contact the reporter to verify and seek additional information.

This safety concern has been followed up by the related AACM department. The compliance with the FTL Scheme and control measure including mixed duties and the time spent to carry tasks at the behest of the operator will continue to be monitored during surveillance audits.

Approach for landing after bird strike on runway was encounter by the previous flight

The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding approach for landing after bird strike on runway was encountered by the previous flight.

The reporter was the pilot in command of an approaching flight. A missed approach was executed by the reporter due to a bird strike reported by the previous departing flight during its takeoff roll.

The reporter's flight was on ILS 34. He learnt about the bird strike through the radio communication between ATC and the pilot of the previous flight.

According to the reporter, the ATC controller asked him whether he was aware of the bird strike encountered by the previous flight, and what his intention about the approach was, without providing information about the runway condition after bird strike. The reporter replied ATC that an inspection on runway should be carried out to confirm the runway condition was suitable for landing. Then the ATC controller told the reporter to go-around.

For the second approach, the reporter asked ATC about the runway condition. ATC advised the reporter that the runway was clear for landing. Aircraft was landed uneventfully.

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The reporter suggested ATC should have standard procedure to perform runway inspection after bird strike and provide information about the runway condition to pilot. He concerned there would be debris on runway after bird strike that could endanger aviation safety.

ATC operation procedure depicted that following to all bird strikes or suspected bird strikes, ATC shall inform departing/arriving aircraft about bird strike and request runway inspections to clear up remains of the bird, if any. ATC controllers are reminded to follow this operation procedure to inform arriving aircraft that bird strike had happened and provide runway conditions to pilot for their decisions on landing.

End

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